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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
WESTERN GATEWAY STORAGE CO.,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No.
vs.
14816
FRED G. TRESEDER and ANTONIA
TRESEDER, his wife, and THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants/Appellants.

* * * * * * *
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

* * * * * * *
NATURE OF THE CASE
This suit was filed by Western Gateway Storage Co., a Utah
corporation, here called "Gateway", seeking to quiet title in itself
to certain real property located in Ogden, Utah, free and clear of
a claimed right of way owned by Appellants Treseder.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Trial was held July 29 and 30, 1976 before the Honorable
John F. Wahlquist sitting without a jury.

Pursuant to a Memorandum

Decision issued August 3, 1976, judgment was entered in favor of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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Gateway and against Treseders and the United States of America on
August 6, 1976.

A motion for a new trial was filed and argued by

Treseders and was denied September 29, 1976.

In substance, the

trial court held that Treseders had lost any right to the disputed
area covered by the right of way.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants ask this court to reverse the findings and
judgment of the trial court and to declare they still own a
valid right of way over Gateway property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gateway is a Utah corporation engaged in dry and refrigerated cold storage and warehousing.

Since 1950, it has been doing

business in a building it constructed in Ogden (R-150) located
just west of Wall Avenue, a main north-south artery.

Its

building is on the north side of 28th Street, adjoining a
railroad spur line.

North of the Gateway property is an area

approximately 240 feet wide and 130 deep, fronting on Doxey Street.
For illustrative purposes, and not drawn to scale, are 2
diagrams showing the lands.

Figure 1 purports to show the proper-

ties as they were in 1949, when Gateway built its warehouse.

The

lands fronting Doxey had 6 nearly identical homes, all on narrow
lots without driveway or garage.
coal shed (R-138, Ex. lBP).

To the rear of each home was a

Access to the rear of the lots, for
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delivery of coal, was by a two-way right of way shown on Figure 1.
It is approximately 9 feet wide, goes south from Doxey (servicing
the homes fronting on Wall Avenue as well), then curves to go
west behind the homes, and then again north to Doxey.
~

Doxey is a

block street that terminates at railroad property and services

only those lands abutting on the north and south side of Doxey.
Apparently, from early days, the railroad owned at least
the west 4 houses, and used them as housing for railroad employees
(R-114).

The coal trucks could enter one of the entrances from

Doxey, get access to whichever of the 6 houses needed, and then
proceed on out through the other entrance (or exit) without having
to turn around or back up (R-138).

Coal deliveries ended with the

advent of gas heat to the neighborhood in 1956 (R-138, 48).
During the years after 1956, the 4 houses on the west were
razed as they were vacated.

Ex. 18-P, a 1962 aerial photo, shows

all 6 houses; 19-P, 1970, shows 4 houses: 20-P, 1975, has only the
Treseder and Newcomb houses left.
Figure 2 is intended to show the property as it was at time
of trial.

The entire area north of the original Gateway building

and west of Treseder is vacant land, with no marked or improved
right of way.

The Newcomb and Treseder homes are marked N & T

respectively.

The area marked ROW is the original easement as it

goes south from Doxey and west behind the 2 lots.

-3-

This easement
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was not challenged by the suit and is fully available to Treseder
for any purpose of ingress or egress.

The lined area is the bal-

ance of the original easement as it went west behind the railroad
homes, and then north to Doxey.

This is the area the trial court

ruled upon.
In 1975, Gateway purchased from the railroad company
(Ex. 16-P) all of the land north of its building to Doxey Street,
except for the Treseder and Newcomb lots.

The property comprising

the right of way is Gateway land, in addition to the vacant lands
formerly occupied by the 4 railroad homes.

Gateway proposes to

use all of its land west of Treseder to build additional warehouse
space (R-89, 90) connected to the existing building.

If Treseder

has a valid right of way from his property west (lined area of
Fig. 2), Gateway cannot do so.
The right of way under attack is limited to that portion
west of Treseder.

It is appurtenant to both the Newcomb and

Treseder property, but none other.

Newcomb did not contest vaca-

tion of the right of way, so the sole issue here presented is
whether Treseder, the dominant estate, has lost the right to main·
tain and use the lands to the west (lined area in Figure 2) for
right of way purposes.
The United States was joined as a co-defendant because of
its mortgage on the Treseder lands, including the appurtenant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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right of way.

It appeared and participated at trial, but has

not pursued appeal.
The trial court found this right of way abandoned;
also the changed conditions made it unjust and inequitable to
require Gateway to keep the right of way open.

Additional facts

will be set out in the arguments.
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
FOUND THE EASEMENT ABANDONED
Appellants' Brief, Pages 4 and 6, cited testimony as to
use of the easement offered by Appellants' witnesses,
favorable to his side.

~nd

most

There was substantial opposing testimony

favorable to Gateway that is not referred to in that brief.

As

the trial court resolved the facts in Gateway's favor, it is entitled to have the evidence reviewed in the light most favorable
to Gateway.

Howarth v. Ostengard, 30 U. 2d 183, 515 P. 2d 444,

(1973)

Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 U. 2d 286, 495 P. 2d 811 (1972).
James Devine, President of Gateway, testified he had been
familiar with the property since 1949 when the building was erected.
He also said storage regulations required a weekly perimeter inspection, and so on a weekly basis, he had looked at the area adjoining
Gateway's building on the north, the right of way (R-82).

He stated

he never saw it used for access to the Treseder or other houses
iR-82)

and it never bore evidence of use.

No one maintained it as
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a right of way, and tor may years it was incapable of use because
of telephone poles erected in the described easement (R-78) ;
piles of junk and debris, growing trees in the easement, and an
abandoned car that was left in it for over a year (Exhibits lP
through 15P; R-80, 81).

DeVine also stated he had never had a

complaint from Treseder about the impassable condition of the
right of way, and in fact, DeVine was unaware there was a right
of way until after Gateway purchased the land (R-14) •

(Of course,

Gateway had constructive notice by reason of the record title
of Treseder) •
DeVine's testimony was corroborated and supported by
several pictures taken of the area before it was cleaned up
by Gateway, showing the impassable condition in detail.

It

was also supported by the testimony of George W. Carver, Dale
P. Nay and Bill Perry, all of whom were familiar with the area
on a daily basis for varying, but lengthy periods of time:
Carver, 1949-1969; Nay 1972-present, and basic familiarity with
the area from 1949-1972; Perry 1949-1968.

None of these witnesses

could recall seeing the right of way used since the era of coal
deliveries.

Nay estimated the Chinese Elm trees growing in the

disputed area to be 5 to 8 years old, and up to 10 feet high
(R-105, 107).

The telephone poles blocking the right of way

in the east-west portion have been there at least 7 years
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(R-115,

84) •

The trial court made findings regarding use of the
disputed area in a Memorandum Decision as follows (R-38 and 39) :
10. The sole use of the easement since 1956 by
the defendants has been to occasionally take
down a board fence and haul building supplies or
large trash accumulations away. The fence
bordering the easement has no gate, but there
is a section which is approximately 6 feet
high and 13 feet wide made of solid board,
with three braces, that can be unnailed and
lifted around to form an entrance way. This
has been done only on limited occasions since
1956. It was done the last time the house
was remodeled, once to bring in building
supplies and once to take them away.
It
was also done once when a tenant moved out
and a new one moved in to haul away a large
accumulation of trash. The Court does not
believe that the easement has been used with
a frequency of more than once every several
years because of the great difficulty in
opening the rear fence and then renailing it.
14. The closing of the easement to the west
will cause the defendants very slight inconvenience. The use of this easement has been
only on a basis of once every few years and
could be made from either direction so long
as the right-of-way is kept clear of cumulative trash or other blockages such as old
cars, etc. The Court believes that a study
of the photographs in question and the growth
of the foliage indicate that the easement has
not been used for through traffic, that is all
away around the "U", since it was used as a
coal delivery passage. Some of the trees
growing in the right-of-way are four inches
in diameter, and there is no record of any
snow having been removed from the right-of-way.
These findings were fully supported, indeed compelled

-7-
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by the evidence befoie the court.

They also fully JUS
· t'f
i y th e

holding of abandonment entered by the court.
It is clear an easement, whether deeded or prescriptive,
·
·
can be abandoned by the holder.
36

u.

Brown v. Oregon Short Line,

257, 102 P. 740 (1909); Anno. 25 A.L.R. 2d 1265.

No

particular length of time is essential to constitute abandonment,
and non-user in itself does not constitute abandonment, but is
persuasive evidence on the question of intention to abandon.
Perry v. Carey, Ind. 1918, 119 N.E. 1010; Restatement, Property
§ 504

(d).

In addition to non-use, other facts consistent with

intent to abandon and useful in determination thereof are allowing the road to be blocked, Hatcher v. Chesner,

(Pa. 1966), 221

A. 2d 305; closing off access to the right of way from the dominam
tenement, Dahnken v. George Romney & Sons, U. 1947, 111 U. 471,
184 P. 2d 211; allowing the easement to become in a state of
disrepair and unusable, Flanagan v. San Marcos Silk Co.,

(Col.

1951 235 P. 2d 107; and change of conditions that eliminate the
need for use of the easement, Brown v. Oregon Short Line, supra.
All of these are present in our case.
since 1956, not been used or maintained.

The way has,

A heavy board fence

without a gate in it was erected by Treseder many years ago,
making access to the way difficult but not impossible (R-127, i2m
The pictorial evidence and testimony portray the right of way
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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largely impassable foL the last several years.

Treseder never

complained to the power company about its poles in his easement
prior to 1976 (R-132) nor to anyone else about its condition
(R-134).
The issue of abandonment is factual, not legal.
Am. Jur. 2d Easements, s 103.

25

The court will determine inten-

tion by all of the relevant evidence, and if there is evidence
to support it, the trial court, as finder of the facts, will be
upheld.

Jensen v. Brooks, Nev. 1973, 503 P. 2d 1224; Flanagan

v. San Marcos, supra.
An easement, because of its very nature as a burden
upon land, is subject to abandonment more than any other interest
in property, Restatement, Property, § 504 (a):
Rationale. This Section indicates that easements may be abandoned more readily than can
most interests in land. That there is an
ownership ready to take the benefit resulting
from an abandonment of an easement is the
probable explanation of the tolerance of the
law toward the abandonment of such interests.
In many cases, of which the ownership of land
in fee is an example, an abandonment, if
permitted, would result in a void in the
ownership of the affected thing, the filling
of which would be largely a question of
chance and would probably produce grave uncertainty of title. In such cases, abandonment,
if permitted at all, is permitted only under
rules stricter than those which prevail in
the case of the abandonment of easements.
Moreover, the abandonment of an easement, if
it produces an extinguishment, will not infrequently result in an increased total use
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the servi~nt tenement since the uses prevented
by the easement may be greater or more productive
than any which can be made under it.
Ex. 15-P is a close photograph of the board fence built
by Treseder in 1964, some 8 years after the end of coal deliveries.
It is seen to be a heavy, sturdy fence indeed, with no gate.
The testimony is that a 13 foot long by 6 foot high segment
of it can be removed by pulling out the nails attaching it
to the posts, and physically carrying it away.
possible, but difficult for one man to do it.

It is apparently
Gateway witnesses

had never seen the fence other than intact.
The significance of such evidence is noted in Dahnken
v. George Romney & Sons, supra, in a somewhat similar factual
setting:
Under the circumstances of this case Romney's
construction or approval of the construction
of the Arthur Frank 1941 addition which has
no door in the west wall opening on segment "A"
is strong evidence of abandonment of segment
"A" as an easement appurtenant to the Romney
property.
{Underlining added).
The Supreme Court noted a door in the south wall however,
giving access to segment "A", and as there was !12. other evidence
of abandonment, upheld the trial court finding against abandonment.

The Supreme Court went on to say:
However, there are in this case no equitable
issues; therefore, it must be considered as
an action at law. Babcock v. Dangerfield,
98 Utah 10, P. 2d 862; Norback v. Board of
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Directors, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339. Our
review in law cases is limited to the determination of whether or not there is competent
evidence to support the judgment of the trial
court.
Despite Treseder's claim he had no intent to abandon,
the evidence of non-use, together with other evidence inconsistent with continued use and ownership of the easement, fully
supports the trial court holding of abandonment.
POINT TWO
THE CHANGE OF CONDITIONS SINCE CREATION OF THE
EASEMENT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT.
When the easement was created, it was to service the
rear of the 6 lots and houses, particularly by coal delivery to
the storage sheds in the rear.

The 2 entrances, and U-shape of

the easement provided convenient access for this purpose up
until the advent of natural gas in about 1956 (R-138).

With

the change, usage of the way became infrequent and irregular
(R-49).

This is accented by Treseders' act in putting up the

high, heavy fence that makes the property almost inaccessible
from the way (R-38).

With the removal of the 4 railroad houses,

there is no reason for Treseder to ever use the way to the west
of his property.

His access to Doxey is closer and more con-

venient to the east - which way is unimpaired by the court's
ruling.
The trial court found the abandoned portion of the
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easement had no econon1ic value to T rese d er ot h er than to force
Gateway to pay an excessive price to be able to use property
it now owns

(R-39) •

We do not propose to this court adoption of a private
form of eminent domain whereby one landowner can obtain property
rights held by others simply on the basis he needs the property
more or will put it to better use.

That is, of course, the

function of the market place, and in the market place, there
is no rule of law that says a seller of land or property rights
must be reasonable.
However, there is a strong body of cases recognizing
property rights can be changed, or lost, by reason of changed
conditions.

This is called the "cessation of purpose" doctrine,

and is perhaps best set out in Hudson v. American Oil Co., 152
F. Supp. 757, D.C. Va. 1957; affd. 253 F. 2d 27, 4th Cir. 1957.
There a deeded easement was held by several homeowners over
Defendant's lands.
highway.

The easement led from the homes to a public

The highway was thereafter vacated, resulting in the

easement still existing but leading nowhere, just ending where
the public road used to be.

The homeowners had alternate routes

to use to get where they wanted to go, but as here, sought to
prohibit commercial use of the property, asserting the right
of way still valid.

The court rejected their position, and
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declared the deeded easement lost:
Minor on real property has long been recognized
as an authority in Virginia for land problems.
In the Second Edition, 1928, Vol. 1, § 106-107,
pp. 145-146, the seven methods of extinguishing
an easement are referred to and as to the first
named method, it is said:
Easements once created may be extinguished
in the following ways:
(1) By a cessation of the purposes
for which the easement was created;
* * *
If the particular purpose for which the
easement is granted isfulfilled or
otherwise ceases to exist, the easement also falls to the ground.
In determining questions of this
sort, the terms of the grant, or,
if it be implied, the circumstances
for which the implication arises,
are to be looked to in order to
ascertain the scope and extent of
the easement* * *
Such is the rule set forth in 17 Am. Jur. Easements
§ 137, p. 1023, and 28 C.J.S. Easements§ 54 a, p.

718. Cases from other states similarly support
this view. Holden v. Palitz, 2 Misc. 2d 433,
154 N.Y.S. 2d 302 {involving the extinguishment
of an easement by reason of the abandonment and
relocation of a street); McGiffin v. City of
Gatlinburg, 195 Tenn. 396, 260 s.w. 2d 152;
Makepeace Bros., Inc. v. Town of Barnstable,
292 Mass. 518, 198 N.E. 922; Central Wharf & Wet
Dock Corp. v. Proprietors of India Wharf, 123 Mass.
567; Hancock v. Wentworth, 5 Mete., Mass. 446;
Town of Freedom v. Norris, 128 Ind. 377, 27 N.E. 869;
Beim v. Carlson, 209 Iowa, 227 N.W. 421. Indeed, in
complainants' brief no authorities are cited to the
contrary.
It is elementary that an easement is one of the rights
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which may be extinguished or destroyed by act of
God, operation of law, or act of the party.
Washburn on Easements and Servitudes, 4 Ed.,
pp. 699-703. As is said in Tiffany on Real
Property, 3rd Ed., Vol 3, § 817, pp. 368-369:
It has been said that when an easement
is created for a particular purpose, it
comes to an end upon a cessation of that
purpose, which means, apparently, that
an easement which is created to endure
only so long as a particular purpose
is subserved by its exercise, comes to
an end which it can no longer subserve
such purpose. The question then is,
in each case, what is the particular
purpose to be subserved by the easement, and this, in the case of an
easement created by grant, is a
question of intention.
The Virginia Supreme Court, in the identical fact
situation, reached the same conclusion, American Oil Co., v.
Leamon,

(Va. 1958) 101 S.E. 2d 540.
Siferd v. Stambor, 214 N.E.2106, Ohio 1966, approved

this same doctrine on a party-wall easement:
If it is unreasonable to confer upon either
party the right to arbitrarily terminate it
at any time, it is equally unreasonable to
permit either, from sheer obstinacy or mere
caprice, to insist upon its continuance
under a material change of the circumstances.
Also see 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Easements, § 106.
As earlier noted, this court in Brown v. Oregon Short
Line, supra, recognized the importance of changing conditions
on the issue of abandonment.

There, as here, the houses served
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by the easement had been razed, and industrial usage was made
of the area formerly used for access to the homes.
The trial court found, after full argument and briefing
on the motion for new trial,

(R-55, 56, 57):

(1)

The trial findings were supported by the evidence.

(2)

The easement was for delivery of coal and has not

been used for that purpose since the 1950's.
(3)

The easement has no present value or useful

purpose to Treseder.
(4)

Treseder has full access for all

necessa~

or

useful purposes with the remaining easement.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit the trial court correctly ruled
upon the evidence and the law.

An easement is a burden upon

lands; it should not be perpetuated for all time without attending
some beneficial or useful purpose to the dominant owner.

This

area of easement lost its purpose, became abandoned by the owners,
and should not continue to burden the property to the west.

RICHARD W. CAMPBELL
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
2650 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah
84401
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